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I. INTRODUCTION
How can someone file a claim for insurance money if not a party
to the insurance policy? In Louisiana, like in other civil law jurisdictions, contracts may produce effects for third parties only when
provided by law.1 The Louisiana Civil Code has an article allowing
contracting parties to stipulate a benefit for a third party (stipulation
pour autrui), but it does not provide much guidance for determining
when such a stipulation exists.2 This lack of a solid framework could
lead practitioners to confuse stipulation pour autrui with other similar legal relationships that confer benefits on third parties, like a
*
J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. The author would like to thank Professor Olivier Moréteau
for his help during the research and editing process.
1. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1985 (2019).
2. Id. at art. 1978.
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trust: “It is only in cases not covered by legislation that a lawyer or
judge may look for solutions elsewhere.”3 Ledet v. FabianMartins
Construction, LLC demonstrates that discovering a stipulation pour
autrui is sensitive legal analysis, which requires us to look past our
civilian roots and into jurisprudence to identify its factors.4 In this
case, the benefit of the insurance was simply incidental, depriving
the plaintiff of direct recourse against the insurer but, as will be seen,
may leave a different cause of action rooted in the Louisiana Trust
Code.
II. BACKGROUND
In Ledet v. FabianMartins Construction LLC, the court was
tasked with determining the existence of this relationship. The plaintiff, Mr. Ledet, is the owner of unit 9-B of the Carrol Condominiums. A broken water pipe above his floor caused serious water damage to much of the complex, along with his individual unit. The
Carol Condominium Association is a non-profit created by La. R.S.
9:1121.101 (Louisiana Condominium Act) for the management of
the complex. Comprised and funded exclusively by unit owners, the
Association has the affirmative duty of securing property insurance
to cover any possible damage to the common elements and units of
the condominium.
After the flooding, both the Association and Mr. Ledet filed a
claim with the insurer. The Association received payment, but Mr.
Ledet was denied payment due to him not being a named insured,
additional insured, or a third party beneficiary. Mr. Ledet filed this
suit against multiple parties for damage to his unit, but the only relevant issue in this case is his cause of action against the insurer.
The insurer, in its answer, claimed they were notified of Mr.
Ledet’s loss through the Association’s claim, and adjusted
3. Id. at art. 1, comment (c).
4. Ledet v. FabianMartins Construction, LLC, 258 So. 3d 1058 (La. App.
5th Cir. 2018).
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accordingly; further, they alleged, he had no right of action against
the insurance company because he was not a named insured.5 In
response, Mr. Ledet claimed he had a cause of action as a third party
beneficiary of the insurance policy, under the theory of stipulation
pour autrui. In ruling against Mr. Ledet’s theory the trial court
stated, “there is no clear expression of intent to benefit the Plaintiff
. . . [t]hus the Plaintiff is not a third party beneficiary and has no
standing to assert a claim.”6 Mr. Ledet appealed.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT
Mr. Ledet’s only means of establishing a right of action against
the insurer rested in the finding of a stipulation pour autrui in his
favor. Louisiana Civil Code article 1978 does not detail the analysis
for establishing a stipulation pour autrui,7 but based on doctrinal
principles set forth by Professor J. Denson Smith,8 the Louisiana
Supreme Court has developed a working interpretation of this article. Smith’s examples for a third party beneficiary relationship
rested on establishing a promisor-promisee obligation that intended
to discharge some other obligation the promisee may have with the
third party.9 This analysis was altered by the Supreme Court in the
Joseph case, to a three-prong test.10 Even though the insurance policy, the Condominium Act, and the declaration specifically mentioned that individual unit owners may be entitled to insurance proceeds, the court found this was insufficient to establish a stipulation pour autrui.

5. Id. at 1063.
6. Id. at 1064.
7. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1978 (2019) (“A contracting party may stipulate
a benefit for a third person called a third party beneficiary. Once the third party
has manifested his intention to avail himself of the benefit, the parties may not
dissolve the contract by mutual consent without the beneficiary’s agreement.”).
8. J. Denson Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana: The Stipulation
Pour Autrui, 11 TUL. L. REV. 18 (1936).
9. Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co., 255 La. 347, 358 (1969).
10. Joseph v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 2 of St. Mary, 939 So. 2d 1206 (La.
2006).
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IV. COMMENTARY
Aligning with the Louisiana Supreme Court, the appellate court
adopted the three-prong Joseph analysis to determine if the contract
stipulates a benefit in Mr. Ledet’s favor.11 Based on this, a stipulation is found only if: “1) the stipulation for a third party is manifestly
clear; 2) there is certainty as to the benefit provided [for] the third
party; 3) the benefit is not a mere incident of the contract between
the promisor and the promisee.”12
An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the
insured; therefore, its interpretation is grounded in contract law. The
interpretation of a contract requires a determination of the common
intent of the parties.13 Mr. Ledet has the high burden of proving the
insurer intended to grant him this benefit, since any party claiming
an enforceable obligation has the burden of proof.14 Analyzing the
contract, the Condominium Act, and the declaration, the appellate
court correctly failed to find a stipulation in Mr. Ledet’s favor.
A. Manifestly Clear Stipulation
The first prong of the Joseph analysis requires the stipulation to
be manifestly clear.15 Reviewing the evidence presented, it is difficult to find a clear stipulation in Mr. Ledet’s favor. Starting with the
plain wording of the contract, “no party other than you [the Association, the named insured], having custody of the Covered Property
will benefit from this insurance.”16 The words “you and your” only
refer to the Association, and their rights are nontransferable without
the insurer’s consent.17 This passage explicitly disproves any inten-

11. Ledet, 258 So. 3d at 1066.
12. Id.
13. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2045 (2019).
14. Id. at art. 1831 (2019): “A party who demands performance of an obligation must prove the existence of the obligation.”
15. Joseph, 939 So. 2d at 1212.
16. Ledet, 258 So. 3d at 1068.
17. Id.
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tion of the insurer to obligate itself to any party besides the Association. Any benefit that would be derived by Mr. Ledet would have
to channel through the claims filed by the Association. This channeling of claims is implied given that the insurer reserves the option
to pay owners directly as a credit of satisfaction for the Association’s
claims.18
Additionally, the insurance payment provision states that any
loss “shall be payable to any insurance trustee designated for that
purpose, or otherwise to the [A]ssociation.”19 The use of the word
“shall” mandates the affirmative action of paying the insurance proceeds only to the listed parties, either the designated trustee (the Association) or the Association. Nowhere in this clause are the individual unit owners mentioned or implied to have a right to insurance
proceeds directly from the insurer. Mr. Ledet did cite to a provision
giving the insurer the option to adjust losses directly with the individual owners, “we may adjust losses with the owners of lost or
damaged property if other than you,” but this still is insufficient to
fulfill this factor.20 Mr. Ledet’s counter argument more likely reserves rights only for the insurer when deciding how to adjust losses;
since direct adjustment is contingent on the insurer’s whim, this provision alone does not create a manifestly clear obligation.
The Louisiana Condominium Act and the Association’s declaration implicitly limit the type of insurance the Association is supposed to obtain. The purpose is to cover the parts of the complex
that unit owners do not own exclusively but share in common, such
as parking, staircases, elevators, and other shared structures and
spaces. The law requires the Association’s insurance policy, but
does not prevent unit owners from obtaining their own insurance.21
Indeed, the Association’s declaration states that “[e]ach Unit Owner
shall be responsible for obtaining his own insurance on the contents
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1067 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1073.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1123.112 (2019).
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of his own Unit.”22 The act created an obligation for the Association
to obtain insurance which would not interfere with individual owners, while the declaration mandated unit owners to insure their own
property. Reading the insurance policy, the law, and the declaration
together negates any claims for a clear stipulation in a unit owner’s
favor.
B. Certainty as to the Benefit
The law creating the Association’s duty to secure insurance
brought with it a strict contingency clause for reimbursing the unit
owners for their loss. “[U]nit owners and lien holders are not entitled
to receive payment of any portion of the proceeds unless there is a
surplus.”23 A unit owner’s right to the insurer’s payment is only triggered if the payment exceeds the cost of repair assumed by the Association. Since there is only potential entitlement to insurance proceeds, the unit owners have no certain benefit arising out of the policy. The only certainty deriving from this clause is the supremacy of
the Association’s claims to the insurance proceeds.
If there is any enforceable obligation, it is against the Association. This obligation is imposed by the Condominium Act; it is not
derived from the insurance policy. Any such payment a unit owner
could potentially be entitled to would depend on the actions of the
Association in spending their insurance proceeds. Mr. Ledet’s reliance on the payment provision allowing the insurer the option to
adjust losses either with the Association or with unit owners individually (as mentioned earlier) is doomed to failure, as it is at the
discretion of the insurer.
C. Benefit Not a Mere Incident
A stipulation pour autrui requires a party to intend to confer an
obligation directly in favor of a third party. Here, the intent of the
22.
23.

Ledet, 258 So. 3d at 1063, 1074.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1123.112 D (2019).
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insurance contract is most likely to be for the discharge of the Association’s duty under the Condominium Act to maintain insurance over
the complex. This is evidenced by the Association’s premier claim to
the insurance proceeds, while leaving the individual owner’s rights
dependent on the Association’s actions. The only means whereby the
unit owners would have dealt with the insurer is through individual
adjustments that the insurer would use as credit toward the Association’s claims against it. Reading the act, the declaration and the policy
together, the unit owners were not to have a claim for the insurance
proceeds, but only the incidental benefits of the repaired common elements of the condominium and potentially any money left over if the
Association failed to spend it all.
The benefits that the individual unit owners would gain from the
insurance on the complex passed through the Association’s insurance
contract. Where coverage of the individual units was not the intent of
the Association’s contract, the unit owners do receive some incidental
benefit from the Association carrying insurance. This benefit is explicitly mentioned to cover the common areas and might allow unit
owners to collect insurance proceeds if they filed a claim with the
Association and there is a surplus. The clear intent was only to create
a relationship between the individual unit owners and the Association.
D. Trust Relationship
On appeal, Mr. Ledet claimed he had a right of action against the
insurer due to the insurance trust relationship set up in his favor. Evidence of this trust relationship can be found throughout the cited policy provisions and the declaration naming the Association as the
“trustee” for the insurance funds.24 The court correctly refused to recognize an enforceable trust relationship directly against the insurer,
but did not delve into much analysis. The court could have clarified
this issue by stating Mr. Ledet’s proper recourse was not directly

24.

Ledet, 258 So. 3d at 1063, 1064-1073.
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against the insurer, but against the Association in its capacity as trustee.
For Mr. Ledet to sue the insurer, his action would have to fall
under La. R.S. 9:2222(1) of the Trust Code, but this only applies “if
the trustee improperly refuses, neglects, or is unable for any reason
to bring an action against the obligor.”25 Unfortunately, the issue
was not properly raised on appeal; therefore, the court was not called
to pronounce on the duties of the Association as a “trustee.” The
court could have simply reiterated the general rule with La. R.S.
9:2222: “A trustee is the proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a right of
the trust estate.”26 To even fall under the exception, Mr. Ledet would
have had to allege fault on the part of the Association, which would
have been difficult given that the insurer was “notified of the loss by
[the Association] and adjusted same in accordance with the terms of
the Policy.”27 Mr. Ledet incorrectly alleged fault on the part of the
insurer as a means of satisfying a stipulation pour autrui claim when
he should have been asserting fault claims against the trustee for refusal or negligent handling of his damage claims.
V. CONCLUSION
The sources of law in Louisiana are legislation and custom.28
While our French style Civil Code is broad enough to cover most
legal issues in its purview, recourse to jurisprudence and doctrine is
often necessary when it comes to applying general provisions to the
specific facts of a case. The Fifth Circuit correctly searched for the
existence of a stipulation pour autrui inspired by doctrine and jurisprudence constante when interpreting Louisianan Civil Code article
1978. Since a stipulation is never presumed, Mr. Ledet had a high
burden of establishing his right of action. The court rightly determined that he was not a third-party beneficiary; instead, he benefited
25.
26.
27.
28.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2222 (2019).
Id.
Ledet, 258 So. 3d at 1063.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2019).
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incidentally from the insurance policy, giving him no right of action
against the insurer.
However, further analysis shows that he was in a trust relationship with the insured, namely the Association entrusted by law with
the duty to purchase insurance for the protection of the condominium. As beneficiary of a trust, he could have sued the Association in
its capacity as trustee of the insurance money. Because he did not,
the court cannot be blamed for refusing to address the trust relationship, though the discussion points in that direction. Stipulation pour
autrui and trusts are very different devices. Though both would benefit the same third party, the stipulation would have created a contractual obligation enforceable against the insurer where a trust
would not. In addition to having plead the wrong doctrine, the plaintiff also sued the wrong defendant. It is only where the Association,
in its capacity as trustee, “improperly refuses, neglects, or is unable
for any reason, to bring an action against the obligor” (here, the insurer),29 that Mr. Ledet would have the right to sue both of them.
There was no such allegation in the present case.

29.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2222.

